Introduction
The recent global financial crisis and subsequent recession sparked, among other things, a call for all manner of returns to previous states of existence, both real and imagined. It also sparked fears that this set of events is returning us to certain undesired states. This included the claim that the crisis and ensuing recession, especially increasing rates of job loss for women, threaten the return of the exclusionary sexual contract characteristic of Fordism. In the words of one commentator, the recession threatens to "send women back to the kitchen."
1 As such, the ongoing recession has been positioned as disassembling the radical transformations in women's labor encountered in post-Fordism, especially the positioning of that labor as a site of potential and promise. In this essay I suggest, however, that imagining the recession as returning us to an exclusionary sexual contract thoroughly misunderstands the processes of the production of value in post-Fordism. In particular it brackets the process of the folding of the economy into society, a process concerning the movement of productive and value-creating activities away from the formal workplace and their dispersal across the social body. To illustrate the folding of the economy into society, I focus on unemployment, specifically on how unemployment in recessionary post-Fordism is both highly productive and eventful, that is, organized through the temporal logic of the event. Crucially, this eventfulness positions unemployment not as opposed to or differentiated from employment but as part of a continuum of productive moments. In this essay I therefore propose that unemployment has become an important site for the theorization of post-Fordist labor and, moreover, allows the idea that the recession is sending "women back to the kitchen" to be thoroughly undone. Consequently, one further element of my analysis here is that unemployment is now also a key ground on which to pose questions regarding the character and place of women's labor in post-Fordism, including questions regarding ongoing transformations to that labor.
Expanding Employment and Feminist Dreams
Prior to the recent global financial crisis, a consensus was emerging that the conditions of post-Fordism had ushered in a new sexual contract, which broke with that associated with the Keynesian social contract. More specifically, a consensus was forming that the underwriting of the employment contract by unpaid labor in the private sphere-the presupposition that the alienation and exchange of labor in return for a wage required a domestically laboring woman who took care of the worker's daily needshad radically unraveled in conditions of post-Fordism. 2 To put this a little differently, under post-Fordist conditions the sphere of production was no longer underpinned, sustained, and mediated by socially reproductive activities performed in the private sphere. Indeed, the separation of the spheres of production and reproduction characteristic of and required by Fordism appeared to be dissolving. Thus, Ulrich Beck discussed the "deprivatization of privacy," Selma Sevenhuijsen a process of the relocation of care (particularly a relocation of care from the home to collective and commercial services), and Cristina Morini the domestication of work, including the process of the house and private space becoming productive space. The unraveling of the Fordist sexual contract was posited to be evidenced in all manner of events, but most significant among these was undoubtedly the expansion and extension of women's paid employment or more precisely the increasing centrality of women's paid labor-on whatever terms-to post-Fordist production. Thus whether as precarious workers in the cognitive and creative industries, 4 as ambitious, self-actualizing can-do girls who train, strategize, and compete for success at work, 5 as highly credentialized professionals and managers, 6 as low-paid workers employed by relatively well-paid professionals to perform domestic, caring, and childcare work, 7 as semiskilled, quasi-professional flexible employees working in the service and communication sectors locked into routine, mundane, yet temporally unbounded jobs, 8 as contingent and underpaid service industry workers in dead-end McJobs, 9 or as workers laboring in "lean" post-Fordist factories, 10 women's labor became central to processes of post-Fordist accumulation.
The significance of this expansion and extension of women's employment was certainly not lost on feminist commentators, particularly since under the conditions of Fordism, women's participation in employment was marked by patterns of exclusion and segregation.
11 Analyzing the case of the United Kingdom, for example, Linda McDowell observed that the changes in women's employment patterns amounted to an "astonishing transformation."
12 Among these changes, particularly striking for McDowell was that regardless of domestic commitments, the majority of women were in paid work, a shift that was certainly not specific to the United Kingdom. In Australia, Belinda Probert recorded a similar pattern, as did Suzanne Bianchi in the United States.
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The importance of these rising labor market participation rates, however, was not simply that such changes suggested a break with patterns of segregation and exclusion but that they also alluded to something else. Specifically, they alluded to a promise that had for so long been associated (however problematically) with women's paid employment and, moreover, suggested the fulfillment of that promise. More particularly, the undercutting of patterns of exclusion and segregation suggested by the expansion of women's employment alluded to the promise-formulated in radically different times-that achieving paid employment could deliver social and political goods to women, including autonomy, independence, and equality. Indeed, such changes alluded to the promise (and draw on a now outmoded and discredited conceptualization) that paid employment may offer women emancipation or liberation from problematic arrangements of gender.
paid employment into the heart of the capitalist accumulation process. Nancy Fraser, for example, argued that the feminist dream of emancipationespecially the second-wave women's movement critique of the exclusionary practices associated with the family wage-was harnessed by post-Fordist capitalism in the service of intensifying the valorization of waged labor, especially women's labor. 15 Fraser observed that the pouring of women into labor markets around the globe went hand in hand with an undercutting of the ideal of the family wage characteristic of Fordism (that is, the ideal in which a male wage should be sufficient to support children and a nonemployed wife). More particularly, Fraser noted that under post-Fordism two-earner families and female-headed households proliferated, and despite the fact that these new norms were often associated with depressed wage levels, steep increases in the number of hours worked, and declining living standards, these shifts were elaborated with recourse to a "new romance of female advancement and gender justice." 16 As such, Fraser claimed that feminism unwittingly provided a key ingredient for the spirit of post-Fordist capitalism. Far from evidencing the fulfillment of social and political promises to women, for Fraser the expansion of women's employment therefore concerned a threading of the dreams of feminism into the capitalist accumulation process. I will return to the issue of the incorporation of such dreams into the spirit of capitalism, as well as to the issue of the fulfillment of promises from earlier times, but first it is important to note that a range of equally consequential shifts was entangled in the expansion of women's employment, including changes to motherhood, the domestic sphere, social reproduction, and a reworking of divisions among women.
Consider, for example, changes to motherhood. In post-Fordism being a good mother became defined less by the occupation of the home and selfless performances of care but by employment. Being in employment became the "right thing to do" for children. This reworking of motherhood transformed established connections between domesticity, femininity, and mothering. 17 The home, especially middle-class homes, increasingly became a site for commercial interactions, particularly the exchange of money for domestic work, child care, and other forms of caring work. 18 The latter was not only connected to the emergence of new divisions among women but also underscored a shift in the relationship between women and the work of social reproduction. 19 Under Fordist conditions, this work was usually unpaid, took place in the domestic sphere, and was ideally performed by a housewife; in post-Fordism this work became disarticulated from the domestic sphere and opened out to precarious labor markets. 20 In short, under post-Fordist conditions, the sphere of social reproduction was denaturalized and hollowed out; a process evidenced by caring and other socially reproductive activities being provided by collective and commercial organizations and by such work becoming the subject of political action. Thus, all manner of policy devices became entangled in the work of relocating socially reproductive activities to the public sphere.
21 Finally, under post-Fordism the conditions of womanhood shifted dramatically, particularly for young women. Rather than being defined by what women ought not to do or cannot do, womanhood was more about what women could do, especially regarding the economy.
22 Armed with such powers of potential, rather than as socializers and reproducers of the future capitalist workforce or as a reserve population poised for capitalist exploitation, in post-Fordism women were routinely positioned as the future of capitalism.
Prospecting for Potential
Although writers such as Fraser were concerned around how many of these changes were linked to an instrumentalization of feminist agendas, hopes, and dreams, other writers engaged with these shifts were not convinced that the latter related to the incorporation of feminism into the spirit of postFordist capitalism. Instead, they emphasized how the expansion of women's employment was implicated in and evidenced new modes of value creation and accumulation, including a radical restructuring of labor and the laboring body. In my own work, for example, I considered how the expansion in women's employment and the transformation of the work of social reproduction related to a shift in value creation. Specifically, I suggested that in postFordist economies value was increasingly organized and harnessed not via retroactive accumulation processes but via a prospecting for potential, that is, for new sites of possibility and future commercial energies. 23 Thus, in post-Fordism the value of the commodity lies not in crystallized, spent, or congealed labor time but in what a commodity might or can do, while the value of labor or the worker lies not in accumulated embodied skills and experience but in potential capacities. I posited further that the expansion in women's employment was hard-wired into this shift in value creation, not least because the exclusion and segregation experienced by women in regard to paid employment in the Fordist era was based on exclusions from the retroactive accumulation of capacities, abilities, and skills, exclusions that were blown apart when the value of labor lay not in retroactive properties but in the future, in potential. In short, I argued that it was a restructuring in the organization of value and labor, especially of the temporality of the latter, which lay at the heart of expansions in women's employment. This restructuring in turn was implicated in the undercutting of a model of production that required and was underpinned by unpaid social reproduction in the domestic sphere.
Drawing on this analysis, especially my argument regarding the shifting temporality of value and labor in post-Fordism, Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper suggested that similar processes were at issue in relation to the productivity of the female body in various forms of bioeconomic activity.
24 They noted that for the expanding stem cell and regenerative medicine industries, female biological productivity is put to work; specifically, they suggested that in these activities "reproductive" tissue is valued for its temporality, namely, its promissory, potential value. Such developments not only opened out the female body to novel forms of value creation, but also transformed the capacities of the female body, particularly inasmuch as bioeconomic technologies extended such capacities beyond their historical uses for reproduction "into an experimental realm of potential and regenerative action."
25 As such, Waldby and Cooper argued that not only do stem cell and regenerative medicine industries have a thoroughly feminized productivity that profoundly implicates the female body in the creation of new forms of surplus value, but also that such developments are entangled in a transformation of female bodily potentiality. For in such developments, rather than an inert or closed substance, the body is rewritten as vital and open-ended. Thus, as I suggested for the post-Fordist economy in general, Waldby and Cooper agreed that the enrollment of women's labor into that economy relates to a radical reworking of labor and value, in which the female laboring body was transformed into a site of potential, possibility, and promise.
Far from relating to the fulfillment or incorporation of past promises or dreams, in these analyses the dramatic reordering of gender, labor, and life in post-Fordism instead concerned thoroughgoing transformations in processes of capitalist accumulation. Indeed, far from delivering on the dreams and promises of times past, such transformations suggested that the post-Fordist economy required the formulation of new understandings of what-if anything-employment might or could promise or deliver in the way of social and political goods. Assessments of the latter were, however, bleak. In his analysis of organizations that mine not for accumulated skill but for potential abilities, Richard Sennett was convinced that the conditions of post-Fordism have hollowed out the social and political promises offered by employment. 26 Indeed, so convinced was he of the latter that he adopted a nostalgia for the certainties of employment from other times, and he did so especially for the temporalities of craft labor, a slowness to which Sennett urged a return.
While Sennett was certainly not alone in such nostalgic yearnings and while such sentiments are often dismissed for their romanticizing content, nonetheless they found their apotheosis in one catastrophic and apparently limit-reaching event, namely, our recent global financial crisis and subsequent recession. Described as an event of "catastrophic generic change," the global financial crisis unleashed complex and sometimes contradictory calls for returns to previous states of existence. 27 These included, but were not limited to, a call for a return to Keynesianism, a return to a "real" material economy, a return to measured consumption, and a return to a present whose condition of possibility is not a mortgaged, commodified, stolen, or broken future, but a present that opens to livable and sustainable futures.
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But the global financial crisis and subsequent recession witnessed a further return, one to paradigms for understanding women's (and men's) employment developed for and under conditions of Fordism, indeed, to an imagined return to the arrangements of gender, labor, and life associated with Fordism. But more than this, the financial crisis and ensuing recession were understood to witness yet a further return, namely, the return to a figure of woman stripped of the rights, independence, and citizenship (however contested and however uneven) apparently won via employment in the context of post-Fordism. In short, the global financial crisis and subsequent recession were understood to witness a return to the excluded and segregated woman of the Fordist sexual contract, to a condition of womanhood marked not by potential and possibility but by a limited jurisdiction over property in the person.
Turning Back Time?
Consider, for example, that in early 2009 the business editor of the UK Observer, Ruth Sunderland, predicted while in previous recessions men had borne the brunt of job losses, the current recession would be the United Kingdom's "first fully feminised recession." Women, she went on, "will suffer the most, jeopardising their hard earned financial independence and equality at work."
29 And this is so, she argued, because in the United Kingdom women tend to dominate in those sectors hardest hit by the recession, namely, in retail and services. Sunderland asked, "Could this downturn reverse the huge economic gains women have made over the past few decades?"
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Katherine Rake of the UK's Fawcett Society shared similar concerns and warned that the recession means that "the advances made by women in the workplace . . . are currently at risk."
31 Women, she argued, "are more directly exposed to the impact of this recession as employees than they were in the recessions of the 1990s or 1980s."
32 This is so, Rake claimed, because women and men are entering into the recession on an unequal footing. Specifically, she claimed that although there have been major increases in women's employment "the nature of women's employment still remains markedly different from men's . . . their experiences of employment are shaped by motherhood and other caring duties, [their] concentration in particular sectors of the economy and the traditional undervaluation of women's jobs."
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Women's working patterns, Rake went on, "make them, on the majority of counts, more economically vulnerable than men from the outset." 34 In a further commentary in the Guardian, Rake went on to declare: "This recession must not be used as an excuse to send women back to the kitchen. The enormous strides that women have made in workplace equality must be protected during tough times and we cannot afford to lose women's vital skills as we seek a route to recovery. Women are now looking to the Government to send out a strong signal to business that it will not compromise on women's rights." 35 Sunderland and Rake were certainly not alone in expressing such fears at what was then the start of the ongoing recession. Indeed, at this time a range of agencies and organizations commissioned research that attempted to map, measure, and predict the gendered contours of the unfolding recession. 36 This body of research typically assembled and used a range of indicators and measures to chart and map these contours, including employment and unemployment rates, job dismissal rates by economic sector, economic inactivity rates, take-up rates of unemployment benefits, and distributions of work force jobs. In addition, econometric forecasting was used in attempts to predict the future shape of the recessionary trends for men and women's relative economic outlooks.
Yet while researchers went about the business of assembling their various indicators and measures to produce their analyses and predictions, what was striking in all this activity was that very little attention was paid to questions of what exactly was being measured, of how things were being measured, and of what the various indicators tracking the contours of the recession were assumed to be indicating. While many of the research reports relating to these efforts certainly stressed that the current recession departed from previous recessions in many ways, not least because a large and expanded number of women faced potential job losses, what was striking in these activities was that many of the instruments used to measure the effects of the recession remained the same as those used in previous recessions. Thus, just as in previous recessions the number of economically active men and women were counted and then compared to numbers in earlier recessionary moments, so too was this procedure adopted for the current recession. And just as in previous recessions, unemployment and job dismissal rates for men and women were counted, charted, and compared across different time frames, so too was this technique put to work for the current recession.
As the recession unfolded and governments variously devised stimulus plans and austerity measures in attempts to address sovereign debt crises, activities attempting to map and evaluate the impact of the economic downturn for women in particular, but also for men, intensified. This was so not least because such government plans and measures typically involved cuts to public spending. Such cuts are widely assumed to have deleterious effects for women because of a concentration of women in public sector employment, a concentration constituted by the expansion of women's employment prior to the global financial crisis. In the UK, for example, a 2011 Trades Union Congress (TUC) research report recorded that "the proportion of women employed in the public sector has risen at three times the rate of men over the last decade."
37 Alongside this, however, the report records women's unemployment rate in the United Kingdom to be at a twenty-three-year high. This situation will, the TUC warns, "only deteriorate as job cuts in . . . health, education, local government and the civil service continue to mount."
38 Indeed, TUC general secretary Brendan Barber subsequently cautioned: "The rising number of women in work has been a great success story of the last decade, but as childcare and child benefits are cut, vital services including education and health are pared back and women's job losses mount, we risk moving backwards and reducing, rather than improving, women's opportunities in the workplace."
39 Barber continued: "The TUC is calling on the Government to do far more to boost investment in the private sector, and to think again about its spending cuts. Our economy simply can't afford to lose a decade of social progress."
40 Thus, and much as at the onset of recession a differential positioning of women and men in the economy was assumed to mean that women were particularly vulnerable in terms of job losses, as the recession rolled out, this vulnerability was understood to intensify, not only in terms of potential job losses but also in the form of cuts to a range of state and quasi-state services. Such cuts were assumed to mean that there would be increasing demands on women to perform unpaid caring labor, demands that militate against employment and employability. Moreover, and just as the recession was understood initially to threaten to return us to a previous state of existence, as the downturn marched on, this return was assumed to be ever closer to actualization.
Again, many echoed such fears. A report commissioned by Northern Ireland's Women's Resource and Development Agency (WRDA) highlighted how cutting public sector employment "predominantly means cutting women's jobs as it is they who make up the majority of the public service workforce."
41 Just as the TUC feared that the actions of governments threaten to turn back time, so did the WRDA: "Under cover of the recession, welfare support is being slashed along with incentives that encourage women into work and towards economic autonomy. The model of society being held up for women is: 'go back to the home, pick up the unpaid caring role that we, the governments, cannot cover and we will focus on incentivising your husband to support you."
42 Reflecting on the findings of this report, Lynn Carvill of the WRDA claimed that Northern Ireland is "returning to the 1950s when a woman's place was in the home."
43 Women, she continued, "are less well positioned than men to weather the crisis. . . . Government responses to the crisis mean we are in danger of turning the clock back in terms of women's equal economic participation. The [government's] proposed welfare reforms will remove women's economic autonomy." 44 Finally, in a political campaign launched in late 2011 protesting the UK government's austerity measures, the Fawcett Society voiced similar fears of such a return. Organized around the theme Don't Turn Back Time, the campaign included a call for a day of action in which protestors were encouraged to adopt 1950s-style clothing. The society advised, "Dress up to send the message that women don't want to be catapulted back to the levels of inequality of yesteryear."
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Rethinking Unemployment
What is certainly clear in these reports, analyses, forecasts, speculations, and campaigns is that the financial crisis and ensuing recession have been and continue to be ascribed with enormous social and political powers, including the power of disassembling the present and returning us to an undesirable past or, rather, the power of creating an anachronistic present; the power of undoing social progress (however problematic that progress might be); the power of blunting the force of political movements; and the power of delaying (once more) the fulfillment of sociopolitical promises and dreams. But while not explicitly stated, such reports and campaigns also claim much more than these powers for our ongoing recession. In the claim, for example, that the still-unfolding recession is returning women to the kitchen, the home, economic dependency, and unpaid domestic and caring roles, these reports and their authors also declare that the global financial crisis and subsequent recession have somehow pushed aside a mode of capitalist accumulation based on prospecting for potential and possibility along with its associated arrangements of labor and life and returned us to a capitalist economy that seeks and requires equilibrium, especially regarding the work of production and the work of social reproduction. More specifically, in protesting that recent economic events are returning women to the home, economic dependency, and unpaid caring and domestic labor, the reports and campaigns by default claim that the recession is returning us to an economic formation in which the work of production (and the extraction of surplus value from this work) is underpinned, mediated by, and requires unpaid socially reproductive activities performed by women in the private sphere. In short, the authors and their reports are declaring a return of arrangements of labor and life associated with Fordism, arrangements organized by the sexual contract, a contract that limited women's social, economic, and political rights, including their right to lay claim to property in the person.
Inasmuch as any moment cannot be perfectly mimicked and reproduced in time, 46 such a return to a historically specific mode of socioeconomic organization-whether desired or not-is impossible. But while the philosophy of time tells that a return to any past is impossible, nonethelessand as my exploration of how gender figures in accounts of our unfolding recession has served to illustrate-a narrative of such a return dominates and frames debate, research projects, research agendas, and political interventions. As such it is worth spending some time and effort to think through exactly how and why such a narrative is not only philosophically but also sociologically problematic. The issues here are multiple, but two stand out as demanding immediate attention and both concern the unemployment of women. First, the reports and campaigns assume that if women are not in paid work, they will necessarily be caregivers, wives, and mothers. Leaving aside the assumption that all women are partnered, heterosexual, and parenting, as well as the further assumption that when women are in paid employment they do not also perform caring or domestic labor, in these accounts women occupy only two mutually exclusive positions: they are either in paid employment or in the home as subjects without the political right to property in the person. Yet surely given the radical shifts in production associated with post-Fordism, not the least of which is the dispersal of productive and value-creating activities away from the bounded workplace across the entire social body-that is, the process of the folding of economy into society, or, as it is sometimes termed, the process of economization 47 -this understanding of both the home and of any activity in that space as solely socially reproductive must be questioned. Thus, not only is the work of social reproduction increasingly politicized as it is provided by commercial and collective services, but the home is increasingly a productive space, as well as a site of speculation and accumulation. 48 In short, both the home and the work of social reproduction have been rewritten as sites of productive possibility.
Second, and therefore, these reports crucially do not consider women to occupy the position of being unemployed. In so doing, and once again, they suggest a return to a Fordist social formation in which women's labor was positioned as a reserve or surplus population for capitalist accumulation. Yet this is an extraordinary lacunae given the now undisputed reliance of capitalism on women's labor, that is, given how women's labor no longer operates as a reserve or surplus population for capital-if it ever did so cleanly or decisively 49 -but is now central for capital's own valorization. It is also extraordinary given the significance of women's incomes to the survival and future of households both pre-and postrecession. 50 Given the latter, it is clear that if any telling or meaningful sociological assessment of the ongoing recession is to take place in regard to gender, it is vital not only to consider the changing conditions of women's employment but also to open out the conditions of women's unemployment to critical investigation. Such a procedure should necessarily involve bracketing assumptions regarding the place and role of women's unemployment in capitalist accumulationfor instance, that unemployed women constitute a reserve or surplus population that always stands ready for exploitation-and instead involve asking a series of open questions regarding the changing relationship between unemployment and post-Fordist accumulation processes, as well as questions regarding the characteristics and experience of unemployment. For if in post-Fordism women's labor is no longer positioned as a reserve or surplus population but as a site of potential and possibility, then surely this implies a transformation in the conditions of women's unemployment, including a transformation in how that unemployment might be sensed.
But although prior to the recent global financial crisis and ensuing recession much consideration had been given to the ways in which employment had changed for women and how, in turn, such transformations were hardwired to shifts in accumulation processes, in retrospect what stands out from this body of work is that very little attention was paid to the issue of unemployment. Indeed, such work tended to assume that transformations in women's labor were to be witnessed in the field of employment. In many ways this assumption was not surprising given the rapid expansion of women's paid employment or, more precisely, that employment growth was largely an issue of increases in women's employment. Nor was it surprising given the political and social dreams historically entangled (however problematically) with women's employment. Yet while much attention was being paid to women's employment, in this focus what went unnoticed were the ways in which unemployment was also changing, a transformation that is of some considerable significance in regard to questions concerning the character and place of women's labor in post-Fordism both in and after the current recession.
Consider, for example, the increasing adoption of a range of labor market activation policies across Europe, North America, and Australasia, especially from the mid-1990s on, as well as the promotion of these policies through international agencies including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union. Such activation policies are ostensibly designed to facilitate reentry into employment for the unemployed or the underemployed through various devices and techniques. These include, but are not limited to, the application of unemployment benefit conditions, whereby receipt of benefits is conditional on participation in training or job placement programs (or "workfare"); time limits on unemployment benefits; job subsidies; counseling; job search assistance; vocational training; counseling schemes; and a host of associated techniques such as lifelong learning. According to the OECD, such measures aim "to enforce work-availability and mutual obligation requirements, meaning that benefit recipients are expected to engage in active job search[es] and improve their employability, in exchange for receiving efficient employment services and benefit payment."
51 While such strategies are certainly not new, what is new is the "centrality of activation to modern welfare states."
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To date, much discussion of activation policies has clustered around two main issues. First, attempts have been made to classify and categorize different activation strategies and techniques. Some, for example, have attempted to correlate different types of strategies with different kinds of welfare regimes, 53 while others have attempted to distinguish between coercive and punitive strategies and enabling and empowering measures.
54 Second, there are ongoing efforts to assess how much activation policies increase employment rates. Lane Kenworthy, for example, mapped employment rates in twenty OECD countries in 1989 and 2007 for groups targeted by activation policies, including prime working-age women. Kenworthy suggested that for the latter in most of the twenty countries employment rates increased, with trends "support[ing] a conclusion that this shift [toward activation policies] has had an impact."
55 But while the classification of activation policies and the relationship of such policies to employment rates may be of interest in and of themselves, what is far more significant regarding activation strategies-and what is lost in these debates-is that regardless of whether such measures are punitive or empowering, and regardless of the relationship of such measures to employment rates, activation policies fundamentally rework the materiality of unemployment.
Eventful Unemployment
Consider, for example, how the techniques and devices of strategies to activate the unemployed demand all manner of activities or actions, including training activities, work experience and placements, active job searches and search reporting, counseling sessions, intensive interviews, and the drawing up of individual action plans. 56 In their demands for such actions, activation techniques and devices transform unemployment from a condition of uselessness or purposelessness, 57 or from a structural position of exclusion or containment, into a highly eventful state, a transformation that in turn erodes the distinction between employment and unemployment. Thus, rather than straightforward time away from productive activity or constituting a different experience of time, 58 activation devices ensure that unemployment concerns all manner of productive activities-from training to (unpaid) work experience and placements. Such activities are not only vital and lively, but they also operate to ensure perpetual market availability or perpetual job readiness, even if employment never arrives. The eventful productiveness of unemployment is laid bare in the following abridged account of unemployed life in contemporary London from a young man called James:
I'm looking to become a trainee electrician, but it's really hard to find anything. I ring companies, email them, anything, but, so far, I've had no luck. I went on an IT course last year, but it really didn't help me out like they said it would. . . . But earlier this year I passed a construction course with JTL [a training provider for the building and engineering sector]. Every morning, I spend time with Tomorrow's People [an employment charity working with marginalized adults and young people] volunteering. I hope this will help my CV and show I've got a bit of experience. In the afternoons, I spend my time looking for trainee schemes or a part-time job. . . . Having experience is more important than having the right qualifications, it seems. But even though I would work for free with an electrician to get experience they can't do this unless I've been through a trainee scheme first. . . . I'm applying for a part-time job at Waitrose at the moment so I can hopefully show employers that I can work hard. . . . I have to keep believing it will happen for me, but I find I have less belief the longer it goes on.
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As this account makes clear, rather than a passive or static state, unemployment-much like contemporary employment-concerns a set of events, of "things that happen in unpredictable ways."
60 Thus unemployment does not concern events that simply unfold in time and hence are predictable and knowable, but events that have not yet and may never happen. Given that this eventful unemployment both demands and concerns all manner of productive actions, we might propose that unemployment is not antithetical to employment, but instead is part of a continuum of moments in eventful productive activity. Indeed, we might propose that in contemporary recessionary post-Fordism both unemployment and employment are laboring activities organized through the temporal logic of the event. If we understand contemporary unemployment in this way, we may also understand that labor market activation devices are not simply measures that attempt to facilitate employment and employability (as they are routinely understood by positive social scientists), but instead are devices entangled in the process of the folding of economy into society. That is, they are devices entangled in the movement of productive and value-creating activities away from the formal labor process and their dispersal across the social body.
My point in all this is that what unemployment comprises and the relationship of unemployment to capitalist accumulation processes have been radically rewritten in post-Fordism. Far from comprising an unproductive state, decommodified or decomposed labor, or a reserve or surplus population always ready for exploitation, unemployment is productive and alive, a shift that in turn is emptying out the distinction between unemployment and employment. Sociologists are certainly not unaware that the category of unemployment, its relationship to processes of capital accumulation, and the experience of unemployment are subject to change. In the 1990s, for example, Zygmunt Bauman observed that though they had once been a reserve army of labor the unemployed were increasingly positioned as failed or flawed consumers or even nonconsumers, which left "them without a useful social function-actual or potential." 61 Yet via measures such as activation devices and associated techniques, this positioning has clearly been dramatically revised. Thus, rather than without social function or role or having a position of uselessness, unemployment now buzzes with value-producing activity, including the anticipation of events yet to come. But while this reworking signals the need for revised sociological understandings of unemployment for the contemporary world-including revisions of what measures of unemployment are assumed to indicate-it also has crucial implications for questions concerning the character and place of women's labor in post-Fordist economies, whether recessionary or not.
More specifically, and contra the claims of the various commentators considered here, the reworking of unemployment in post-Fordism clearly indicates that whether waged or not, women's labor does not constitute a reserve for capital. Indeed, rather than evidencing a return to a social formation in which women's labor operated to reproduce and socialize the workforce and stood poised for capitalist exploitation, the ongoing and unfolding recession-especially the lively and productive unemployment associated (although not simply coexisting) with it-underscores how the restructuring of labor in post-Fordism concerns not only employed but also unemployed labor. Thus, just as employment in post-Fordism concerns the prospecting for potential and the anticipation of events yet to come, unemployment in post-Fordism shares this temporality, a temporality which marks a radical departure from the condition and experience of unemployment in Fordism. In turn, this departure compels a confrontation with the ongoing process of the folding of the economy into society. The eventful productivity of unemployment in post-Fordism, I suggest, demands that the radical transformations to women's labor in post-Fordism should not simply be conflated with employment (and especially expanded employment for women) but should be understood as a thoroughgoing transformation across the social body. Indeed, the eventful productivity-or the work-of unemployment in post-Fordism suggests that unemployment now constitutes a key ground for posing questions regarding the potentialities of the female laborer in post-Fordism, including questions regarding the relationship of these potentialities to accumulation processes.
Conclusion
In this essay, and through a consideration of the changing conditions of unemployment in post-Fordism, I have questioned the widely circulating view that the ongoing recession is threatening the return of arrangements of labor and life associated with Fordism, that is, the return of a social formation organized and mediated via an exclusionary sexual contract. More specifically, by considering how unemployment concerns all manner of productive, eventful activities, I have challenged the view that the ongoing economic recession can return women to the home, to economic dependency, and to unpaid domestic and caring labor, that is, to a position of exclusion and segregation. Understanding that the ongoing recession is not (and cannot) return us to any previous state of existence also enables further questions to be raised regarding related assumptions concerning the recession. In particular, it enables an interrogation of the assumption that the recession is emptying out or instrumentalizing the promise of paid work for feminism and for women, especially the promise of the delivery of social, political, and economic rights. For if, as I have argued here, the recession makes visible not a return to the social formations of Fordism but the externalization of production, that is, the folding of the economy into society, then the idea that post-Fordist waged labor occupies a privileged site in regard to the delivery of any forms of social justice surely must be questioned. Just as Loïc Wacquant has argued that employment is no longer any kind of remedy for poverty, 62 then it should also be recognized that the increasing marginalization of waged labor in post-Fordism means that employment is no cure for other kinds of social ills. In sum, the current recession should compel us to recognize that the very idea that employment can deliver on social and political goods is one relevant to other times.
